In this paper, we introduce the Input Rank as a measure to study the organization of global supply networks at the firm level. We model the case of a firm that needs assessing the technological relevance of each direct and indirect supplier on a network-like production function with labor and intermediate inputs. In our framework, an input is technologically more relevant if a shock on that upstream market can hit harder the marginal costs of a downstream buyer, considering the topology of the supply structure. A higher labor intensity at each stage buffers the transmission of upstream shocks in the network. In addition, we provide for the possibility that producers have limited knowledge of inputs in the supply network, hence they can underestimate the relevance of more distant inputs. After applications, the Input Rank returns a matrix of technological centralities that order any direct or indirect input for a representative firm in any output industry. We compute the Input Rank on U.S. and world input-output tables. Finally, we test how it correlates with choices of vertical integration made by 20,489 U.S. parent companies controlling 154,836 affiliates worldwide. We find that a higher Input Rank is positively associated with higher odds that that input is vertically integrated, relatively more when final demand is elastic. A supplier's Input Rank remains a significant predictor of a firm's decision to integrate even after controlling for the relative positions on upstreamness/downstreamness segments.
Introduction
Modern economies are organized as webs of specialized producers. Each company can be plunged into a production network that starts with the idea of a product by engineering, design or research labs, and finally reaches the consumers after a series of technological steps, including the manufacturing of parts and components, an assembly line, and the provision of post-production services by marketing, advertising and distribution industries.
In fact, the technical configuration of production processes can be much complex and recursive in nature when the same intermediate goods and services are repeatedly needed over a supply network. A global fragmentation of production processes can originate either spider-like or snake-like configurations, depending on technological peculiarities (Baldwin and Venables, 2013) . Take logistics and distribution services, which are crucial in the delivery of intermediate inputs to
companies, as well as in the delivery of final goods to consumers. Or else, consider the case of most innovative activities, which may require the services of R&D labs at different stages of completion before final delivery to consumers. Nevertheless, Global Value Chains (GVCs) have been mainly studied assuming a separation of tasks over linear sequences, i.e. the 'chains', oriented on upstream-downstream directions, therefore neglecting the recursive nature of modern production (Costinot, Vogel and Wang, 2013; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Fally and Hillberry, 2015; Antràs and de Gortari, 2017; Alfaro et al., 2019; de Gortari, 2019) . For the sake of simpler assumptions on both theory and empirics, previous works propose position metrics, e.g. the upstreamness or downstreamness of a production stage, which simulate productive sequences on Input-Output tables (Fally, 2012 , Antràs et al., 2012 , Antràs and Chor, 2013 , Alfaro et al., 2017 , Miller and Temurshoev, 2017 , Wang et al., 2017 , Antràs and Chor, 2017 . It certainly is an advancement for understanding the mutual economic interdependence of firms organized over GVCs. However, linear approximations of complex network structures are likely to lead to an underestimation of the importance of some suppliers and an overestimation of the importance of others.
Take the case of the U.S. economy, which we plot as a production network 1 in Figure 1 .
According to the U.S. BEA 2002 Input-Output tables, we can represent the U.S. economy as a collection of 425 industries (i.e., nodes) linked by 51,768 transactions (i.e., edges). In Figure 1 , we 1 A bird's eye view of the U.S. production network represented in Figure 1 returns an idea of a 'global' centrality for each industry within a production network whose structure presents a density of 0.286, i.e., the fraction of actual linkages out of all potential linkages. The average path length connecting any two industries is just 1.7 links, pointing to a small-world nature of the US economy. Briefly, on average, any producer in an output industry sources inputs from most of the other industries, either directly or indirectly. Indeed, the network of Figure 1 is not separable: it is self-contained in a unique connected component where it is always possible to run seamlessly from one node to another just following input linkages. organize U.S. industries on a two-dimension space according to their reciprocal connectivity, following a Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) layout, which in our case posits more requested inputs at the center stage. Interestingly, services industries make the core of the U.S production network because they are used as direct inputs in many other manufacturing and services industries. On the other hand, primary industries like agriculture and forestry are rather peripheral and mostly located in the north-west area of the graph. Among services, let us pick the case of R&D (code 541700) and Wholesale Trade (code 541800), which seem to be among the most connected industries. In fact, wholesalers have a prominent role in professionally distributing many intermediate inputs in different moments of the production process, whereas R&D services are pivotal in fostering innovation across most U.S. sectors. Now, let us consider the case of two consumer goods industries:
Electronic Computer Manufacturing (code 334111) and Automobile Manufacturing (code 336111). They appear to be at the periphery of the U.S. production network because they mostly meet final consumers. However, once we compare the network positions of selected industries in Figure 1 with their positions on the downstreamness segment (Antràs and Chor, 2013) in Figure 2 , we curiously find that both R&D and Wholesale Trade are in the middle of an ideally linear supply chain. This is in contrast with the stylized chain we may have in mind, where a representative business line starts with R&D services and ends with distribution services. In fact, when we review computation methodologies, we find that downstreamness segments 2 are essentially obtained considering the weighted relative usage of inputs, intermediate vis à vis final, collapsing an otherwise complex production network on a linear sequence. On the contrary, we argue that the mutually interactive and recursive nature of modern production is better understood when we consider the entire technological network, i.e. not only how inputs enter in a different order (downstream vs upstream), but also how central they are when they are requested as inputs of inputs at different stages of production.
In this respect, we introduce the Input Rank 3 as a bilateral measure of the technological relevance of any input-output relationship for the organization of global supply networks. We start by modeling the problem of a producer who plans the delivery of her output based on the requirements of both direct and indirect inputs. A network production function includes both labor and 2 More recently, Alfaro et al. (2019) compute a Relative Upstreamness to consider the heterogeneity of input positions oriented towards different outputs. However, also in this case, the position of R&D services is on average located in the middle of the output-specific technological sequences, i.e., the average upstreamness value is 3.044 for an indicator that originally ranges approximately from 1 to 8.9. 3 When we compare the Input Rank with Relative Upstreamness sourced from Alfaro et al. (2019) , we find that they convey different information. A Spearman rank correlation test shows that they are correlated -0.31, with a p-value < 0.001. intermediate inputs at each production stage. The most important upstream markets for a representative producer will be the ones that can have a higher impact on the firm-level marginal costs, when a friction transmits downstream, considering the topology of the supply structure. In our framework, a higher labor intensity at each stage potentially reduces the transmission of the shock from upstream markets. In addition, we model the possibility that a final producer has imperfect information on inputs of the supply network. In this case, the ability to outreach indirect suppliers is more limited in complex supply structures, and the producer can underestimate the role of transactions far away in the network structure.
For sake of comparison with previous studies, we compute the Input Rank on U.S. Input-Output tables, sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US BEA, 2002) , and world Input-Output tables, sourced from both WIOD and EORA. Finally, we test the correlation of the Input Rank with choices of vertical integration, in the fashion of Antràs and Chor (2013) , Alfaro et al. (2017) , and Del Prete and Rungi (2017) . On a sample of 20,489 U.S. parent companies controlling 154,836 affiliates worldwide, we find that a higher Input Rank is positively associated to higher odds that a (direct or indirect) input is vertically integrated, relatively more when final demand is more elastic. We argue that vertical integration allows firms reducing frictions coming from upstream markets, and this is an incentive to enlarge the boundary to inputs that are more relevant in the supply network. Yet, we also find that parent companies preferably integrate inputs that are relatively proximate on the supply network, supporting our theory that limited knowledge of complex upstream markets makes a representative producer underestimate their impact on final production. Our findings are robust to different sample compositions, to changing empirical strategies, and to the inclusion of downstreamness/upstreamness metrics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section positions our contribution with respect to related literature. Section 3 introduces a compact theory for the Input Rank. In Section 4, we compute the Input Rank on both the U.S. and worldwide Input-Output tables to describe preliminary evidence. In Section 5, we test the role of the Input Rank in firm-level choices of vertical integration. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.
Related literature
A flourishing strand of research studies how the network dimensions in the organization of production can contribute to explaining the response of aggregate fluctuations to microeconomic shocks (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Carvalho, 2014 , Acemoglu et al., 2016 . According to Oberfield (2018) , buyers and suppliers establish linkages that determine both individual and aggregate productivities, as the organization of a network is the result of endogenous collective choices.
From an international perspective, Chaney (2014) studies the dynamic formation of trade networks based on searching processes of partners by exploiting direct and indirect contacts in destination markets. More in general, the literature on trade and production networks is still in its infancy, and many questions remain unanswered (Bernard and Moxnes, 2018) . This is the case of the emergence of GVCs, which are mainly modelled and tested as supposedly linear technological sequence (Fally, 2012; Antràs et al., 2012; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Miller and Temurshoev, 2017; Wang et al., 2017; Antràs and Chor, 2018; Alfaro et al., 2019) , even if the existence of spider-like vs snake-like configurations has been acknowledged as depending on engineering details (Baldwin and Venables, 2013) . A first step in modeling a production network has been made by Antràs and de Gortari (2017) , who assume that a linear technology interacts with central geographic locations. Richer information on the configuration of GVCs is also exploited by de Gortari (2019) to build numerical counterfactuals on the transmission of value from inputs to outputs.
In our contribution, we introduce the Input Rank as a network position measure of the technological relevance of any direct or indirect input for a representative producer in an output industry. The Input Rank considers the recursive nature of real-world webs of suppliers and buyers when trade or contractual frictions can be encountered at any production step. We model the problem of input ranking on a nested production function that encompasses upstream markets because what happens in any upstream market has consequences on the ability to delivering a final output. A producer will rank any direct or indirect input relatively higher when a sourcing friction on that input market transmits downstream with a higher impact on marginal costs. Realistically, we provide for the possibility that a producer may have only a limited knowledge of the entire supply network, discounting relatively more the risk of frictions coming from faraway upstream industries.
Our measure is to some extent inspired by the PageRank centrality first applied in social networks and search engines (Brin and Page, 1998) , to assess the relevant information consumed by internet users. The PageRank tool has by now spread to many different domains 4 , from biology and genetics to financial debts, bibliometrics, and engineering of road networks Gleich (2015) .
The main idea of the PageRank is that a web page is more important if other important web pages have hyperlinks pointing to it. In our framework, the Input Rank assumes that: i) a (direct or indirect) input that is relatively more requested to produce other (direct or indirect) inputs must rank relatively higher;
ii) a (direct or indirect) input that is relatively more requested to produce other highly requested inputs is relatively more relevant than a (direct or indirect) input that delivers to lessrequested inputs.
Eventually, we test the association of the Input Rank against vertical integration choices by U.S. multinational enterprises. In this, we relate to the recent strand of research that studies the firm-level organization of GVCs 5 . Acemoglu et al. (2007) are the first to study a theoretical framework where unique headquarters commit to contracts with multiple suppliers. More recently, Harms et al. (2012) analyze the offshoring decision of firms whose production process is characterized by a sequence of steps and a non-monotonic variation of transportation costs. Costinot et al. (2013) derive a sequential multi-country model in which mistakes can occur with a given probability along a sequence, hence countries performing more knowledge-intensive tasks are better situated relatively more upstream and participate to a larger share in world income distribution.
Interestingly, Fally and Hillberry (2015) include Coasian transaction costs to explain the length of a supply chain and the cross-country variation in gross output-to-value added ratios. In each of the previous works, the notion of a GVC assumes different shades of meaning.
We stream our work following the intuition by Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) , who model a supply chain as a technology made of production stages where each downstream output depends on a set of upstream (direct or indirect) inputs. In that framework, all producers shall rely on a surplus from the sale of the final output, and economic dependence is established along the supply chain, for how that surplus is optimally generated by and allocated among producers. In this case, the main prediction is that final-good producers integrate stages that are relatively more downstream (upstream) when final demand is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). However, when it comes to firm-level empirics, Del Prete and Rungi (2017) find that vertical integration choices are not always in line with theoretical predictions, as parent companies and affiliates locate not so far from each other along upstreamness/downstreamness segments. In this contribution, we build on a similar framework and find that a higher Input Rank is always associated with higher odds that that input is vertically integrated, even after controlling for the position on the downstreamness/upstreamness segments, and that proximate inputs on the network are more likely integrated than distant ones.
A model for the Input Rank
In this section, we lay out the theoretical foundations for input ranking over supply networks. Assessing the importance of a supplier of a given firm is not a straightforward task when production processes are fragmented. To illustrate this point, we start with a stylized example depicted in Figure 3 , where nodes indicate sectors or, alternatively, representative firms from those sectors, while directed links indicate the flows of goods or services. The output of each firm can be used as an intermediate input, as well as a consumption good.
Figure 3: A stylized supply network
Let us focus on the supply chain of firm 1. Failure of firm 4 to provide an appropriate input to firm 3 creates a friction that affects firm 3's production process. The friction is (partially) passed down to firm 1 and firm 2 because both use input 3 in their production. For instance, the aforementioned friction can imply an increase in the price of the intermediate input provided by firm 4, which will increase the production cost of firm 3. This will, in turn, affect both firm 1 and firm 2 that use good 3 in the production. Eventually, the production process of firm 1 is affected by both firm 2 and firm 3. More in general, we expect that a firm will be more affected by a distortion hitting an upstream supplier if: i) firms in the economy rely more on the deliveries of intermediate inputs; ii) the network is more connected, in the sense that there are more paths starting from the affected supplier and leading to that firm.
When supply networks become more complex, it is also conceivable that the manager of firm 1 does not fully observe what is happening on upstream markets, and therefore she cannot Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488349 establish the relevance and the magnitude of a shock coming from those markets. This is especially true for suppliers that are relatively more distant in the supply network. For instance, the manager of firm 1 may not be able to observe the quality and the quantity of intermediate inputs that firm 6 and 7 reciprocally exchange.
In line with the above intuition, we present below a theory for the Input Rank that accounts for the topology of a supply network where frictions (e.g. trade barriers or contractual institutions) potentially transmit downstream, including the case that knowledge of indirect suppliers is more limited. Our theoretical framework is in many respects a standard for production networks 6 , and thus we present it in a quite compact manner. Formal proofs of the claims are in Appendix A.
There are two types of agents in the economy: firms and the representative consumer. We denote the full set of firms in the economy with N. Firms group in M sectors. Each firm belongs to exactly one sector, and it produces a single differentiated variety of a sector-specific good.
Consumers
The representative consumer owns all firms in the economy and supplies one unit of labor inelastically. The preferences of the consumer over M goods are defined with the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
where is the consumption of good k and ∑ = 1, while the parameter = ∏ − =1 is a normalizing constant that simplifies computations. The composite consumption good k is defined with:
where ( , ) is the consumption of variety i of a good k, > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of good k, and denotes the number of firms, each producing a different variety i in the kth sector.
The consumer maximizes her utility subject to the following budget constraint:
( 3) where ( , ) is the price of variety i in sector k, ( , ) is the profit of firm i in sector k, and w is a worker's wage bill.
Firms
Firms in the k-th sector are symmetric and benefit from the same technology with constant returns to scale that combines labor and intermediate inputs. Each firm in a sector produces an imperfectly substitutable variety i of good k. Let us denote with ( , ) the output of firm i from sector k, with ( , )its labor input, and with ( , , ℎ, ) the amount of variety j of good h used in the production of variety i of good k. The profits of any firm i in sector k are simply defined with:
The production function of firm i in sector k is defined by
where and are standard Cobb-Douglas elasticity parameters such that + = 1, while
� is a normalizing constant that simplifies computations. Due to the Cobb-Douglas nature of the production function, the non-negative vector ( ℎ ) ℎ=1 reflects the relative intensity with which firms in sector k use intermediate inputs ℎ ∈ {1,2, . . . , }. Hence, the sector level production structure of the economy is characterized by the (column-stochastic) adja-
Crucially, we include in (5) an input-specific productivity parameter, ℎ , which catches any general distortion/friction encountered on an upstream market h. In this basic framework, market frictions are assumed exogenous and valid for all buyers of the same input 7 . The higher the friction for an input market the lower the parameter, ℎ . Distortion ℎ , in a reduced form, captures any type of distortion that results in a decrease in the productivity of intermediate inputs produced in sector h. For instance, when it is difficult to write a contract for sourcing goods produced in a sector h, it is more likely that firms will find those inputs from sector h less compatible with the production process, hence less productive. Alternatively, in our model, the friction ℎ will have the same effect as a price wedge. Indeed, when there is a friction ℎ , the price of 1 unit of good h (with productivity 1) will effectively be scaled up by factor 1 ℎ ⁄ . One obvious case of such market frictions is tariff or non-tariff barriers, which increase the per-unit input price.
At this point, we define the composite intermediate input as an aggregate of varieties produced in a sector h, in the form:
Therefore, we can rewrite (5) as
Market equilibrium
We assume that firms in a sector compete in a monopolistic competition environment, and thus set their price to a constant markup over marginal costs. Following Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Grassi (2017) , we assume that firms set their prices taking as given the other sectors' prices and quantities, the wage bill, and the aggregate prices and quantities. We are now ready to introduce a notion of market equilibrium we envisage, whose existence and uniqueness follow from standard arguments. For details, see for instance Baqaee (2018) . ( , ) , wage w, input demands ( , , ℎ, ), outputs ( , ), consumption ( , ), and labor demands ( , ) such that:
Definition 1. [Market Equilibrium] A market equilibrium is a collection of prices
(i) Each firm maximizes its profits taking as given the sector price level and demand, (ii) The representative consumer chooses consumption to maximize utility, (iii) Markets for each good and labor clear.
The Input Rank
For our purpose, we consider two scenarios. First, we discuss a case when firms perfectly observe the structure of their supply network, i.e. they know the full technology made of direct and indirect inputs needed to deliver their output. More realistically, in a second scenario, we assume that firms have imperfect information on their supply networks, which may include a relatively high number of input-output relationships.
Before presenting our results, let us introduce further notation. We call a diagonal matrix D that matrix that contains information about sector-specific intermediate input elasticities,
That is, each element of the matrix D tells us how much intermediate inputs a representative firm in a sector uses over total inputs in the equilibrium. Further, we introduce parameter ∈ (0, 1] that captures the probability (share of) suppliers of each firm that a manager of firm ∈ observes. The following definition formally introduces the concept of the Input Rank in production networks.
Definition 2. [Input Rank]
Denote with the k-th unit vector. We define the Input Rank of a supplier of an input h relative to the producer of an output k as:
In other words, the bilateral
In a special case, when all sectors have the same elasticity of the output with respect to intermediate inputs, = , ∀ = 1,2, … , , the Input Rank essentially captures the sum of all weighted paths from k to h in the production network, moving upstream through the network, where paths of length d are discounted by a factor ( ) . Finally, we note that the inverse in (8) exists since is a column stochastic matrix, hence the spectral radius of is 1. Since ≤ 1 and ≤ 1, ∀ = 1,2, . . . , , the inverse in equation (8) will also exist.
From the perspective of a producer, the Input Rank vector, = ( ℎ ) ℎ=1 , encodes the information on the structure of the production technology on her supply network, and a possibly limited ability to outreach all suppliers.
Perfect information on the supply network
Let us start considering the case when a producer perfectly observes her supply network, i.e. when = 1. The following proposition relates the Input Rank, ℎ ( , 1), and the marginal costs of a producer, ( , ), after considering her entire supply network. Proposition 1. Let ˘( , ) denote the logarithm of the marginal cost of production of firm i in sector k. Let ˘ℎ denote the logarithm of the friction on the upstream market h. Suppose that firms perfectly observe the production network. Then:
We report proof of Proposition 1 in the Proof Appendix. In a nutshell, the higher the potential impact of frictions from an upstream market on marginal costs, the higher the ranking of that input from the perspective of a downstream buyer. In our framework, a lower distortion implies a higher productivity parameter, ℎ , hence a decrease in the marginal costs of production.
Eventually, the impact of any upstream friction on the marginal costs of a final producer is a function of both the structure of the supply network, , and of the relative input intensities, ( ) =1 , of each industry.
Imperfect information on the supply network
Suppose now that a producer i observes her supply network with some imperfections. That is, a firm i in a sector k has a probability of observing suppliers of firms of any given sector in the network. 8 We assume that this probability is output-specific, i.e., it varies across end-use sectors.
In this way, we explicitly contemplate the possibility that some supply networks are too complex to explore, and a producer is able to assess the contribution of any indirect input based solely on the portion of technology she is able to observe. The following corollary directly follows from Proposition 1:
8 More realistically we may consider the case when firms in sector k observe suppliers of firms in r with independent probability , ∈ . Then we would replace scalar with diagonal matrix that has diagonal elements equal to . One possible interesting interpretation of in that case is that it would also capture the contractibility of a sector, in the sense of Rauch (1999) . Corollary 1. Assume that each supplier of firms in sector k is observed with probability , then: Briefly, from the perspective of final producer i, any friction on an upstream market can be perceived as less important the more difficult its exploration because it is more distant in the supply network, given the damping factor, , and considering the relative usage of intermediate inputs, .
To understand better the intuition introduced above, it is worth looking back once again at the fictional supply network reported in Figure 3 . When exploring her supply network, any time the manager of a firm 1 tries to collect information about upstream transactions, say about transactions between firm 3 and its suppliers, she has a limited ability to know the quality and quantity of deliveries. She can call the direct supplier and ask or, alternatively, she can gather information on the market when, for example, prices and quality of upstream inputs are relatively standard.
However, at any further passage upstream, e.g. from firm 4 up to firm 6, the same problem starts all over again. Eventually, the dumping rate discounts distant nodes relatively more than proximate nodes, hence assuming that the ability to outreach on indirect suppliers is decreasing with the distance on the supply network 9 .
On the other hand, some industries are relatively less input-intensive than others, hence when is low, the impact of a missed delivery by a direct or indirect supplier has a smaller impact on the final producer.
Observations
On the role of centrality Both in the case of perfect or imperfect information, the structure of the supply network, , is crucial to understand the impact of any frictions or shocks coming from upstream markets. From this point of view, the Input Rank catches the features of sophisticated technological processes, when some inputs are used more than once and with a different intensity on a firm's supply network. We insist here on the characteristics of the Input Rank as an eigenvector centrality, which measures the technological relevance of each input from the perspective of a downstream producer, such that:
i. an input is more technologically relevant if it is requested to produce other (direct or indirect) inputs;
ii. an input is more technologically relevant in downstream industries if it is requested to produce other highly requested (direct or indirect) inputs.
For a visual intuition of the previous characteristics, let us look back at the fictional supply network of Figure 3 . The first property is evident if we compare the roles of firms 2 and 3. They are both direct suppliers of firm 1, but firm 3 is relatively more central in the supply network of firm 1 because it also delivers to firm 2. If firm 3 fails to deliver, firm 2 can also have problems and the impact on firm 1 is magnified.
The second property is evident if we compare the roles of firms 4 and 5. They are both indirect suppliers of firm 1 located at the same distance on the supply network. Yet, firm 4 is relatively more important in the supply network of firm 1 because it delivers to firm 3 that is, in turn, more relevant because more 'central' among direct suppliers. In other words, firm 4 borrows some 'centrality' from firm 3. In fact, if firm 4 does not deliver, firm 3 will receive the distortion and will pass it to firm 1 through two different production paths.
On the role of frictions on input markets
There are plentiful reasons to consider frictions over supply networks. For example, when an input is sourced from abroad, tariff or non-tariff barriers can reverberate to downstream buyers and have an indirect impact on marginal costs. Among others, a change in contracting frictions on upstream markets can have a similar impact on a downstream producer. Whether the input is delivered from abroad or not, a buyer and a supplier will never be able to sign the perfect contract that provides a detailed understanding of all the responsibilities and requirements, eliminating forever the risk of later disputes. Hence, an input delivery may not be entirely contractible, and we can assume that the degree of contractibility is specific to an input market, i.e. encompassing all the varieties offered on that market. Accordingly, our productivity parameter, 0 < ℎ ≤ 1, catches the compatibility of that input in the production process. In our case, a higher contractibility on an input market implies a higher productivity parameter for that input, and a lower impact on marginal costs, as (9). Alternatively, one can think of the productivity parameter, ℎ , as a searching cost on an input market. In this case, a lower searching cost for any single input will reduce firm-level marginal costs. This approach is in line with the original intuition by Rauch (1999) , who considered an input relatively more contractible when it is sold on organized exchanges or when its price is referenced.
However, please note how the source of any friction is considered always exogenous in our simple framework, as is the organization choice of the firm. Our basic model does not explicitly entail a case of intra-firm vis à vis arm's length exchange of inputs. Nonetheless, we can argue that, in an environment like the one captured by our model, it could be more beneficial for any firm, ∈ , to integrate a supplier of an input, ∈ ℎ, if the expected decrease in the per-unit cost of production,
, is larger after vertical integration. That is, if we expect that any friction becomes lower or any shock can be controlled after vertical integration, making an input more productive.
Then, in our framework the productivity parameter ℎ becomes bigger and the impact on a firm's marginal costs is positive. This may be accomplished, for instance, through a better coordination of the production process or after a more efficient contract enforcement. We test this correlation in Section 5, although we can say nothing more on the optimal organization of the firm boundary, e.g. how many inputs are made in-house and how many are bought on the market.
On the role of the damping rate
We model imperfect information about a supply network as an output-specific dumping rate ∈ (0,1], which encodes the ability of a representative producer in an industry to search information on upstream markets. From a practical point of view, when is smaller, direct and indirect suppliers that are relatively closer to the final producer will have a relatively higher Input Rank than more distant suppliers. To illustrate this property, we plot comparative statics of the Input Rank of main nodes detected in Figure 3 as a function of the damping rate. For simplicity, we assume that all inputs of a given firm are symmetric, meaning that for a fixed node j and any two of its suppliers r and s, we have = . Interestingly, although there are more paths connecting firm 1 to firm 6 than firm 1 to firm 2, firm 2 will eventually have a disproportionately higher Input Rank when the damping rate is smaller and smaller. Please note how, empirically, the average value of across sectors in the US economy is estimated 0.5 by Acemoglu et al. (2012) , hence we can expect the damping factor to be relatively small on average. In the following analyses, we first test a damping factor calibrated exclusively on 0.5, and then we discount it using input average contractibility à la Rauch (1999) .
On the role of the elasticity of substitution
In the Proof Appendix, we include a demonstration that the more elastic is the demand of the final producer the higher the proportional impact of frictions on firm-level profits, ˘( , ) ℎ > 0, whenever > 1. We already gather from Proposition 1 that any downstream producer has an incentive to reduce frictions over her supply network to avoid lesser marginal costs. Here we add that such an incentive is higher when the demand faced by the final producer is relatively more elastic. See also the role of elasticity of substitution tested on vertical integration choices in Section 5.
Applications of the Input Rank
We compute the Input Rank on the U.S. and world Input-Output tables. U.S. I-O 2002 tables, compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), sketch a reasonably fine-grained supply network established among 6-digit industries. The same tables have been extensively used to study production networks (Carvalho, 2014) , vertical integration choices (Acemoglu et al., 2009; Alfaro et al., 2016) , and to compute Upstreamness/Downstreamness metrics Chor, 2013: Alfaro et al., 2019) . In Figure 1 , we already showed how a solid and complex production network emerges from these tables, made of 51,768 linkages established among 425 industries. After a closer look, we register a strong heterogeneity in the sourcing strategies at the industry level. For example, in Appendix Figures C1 and C2 , we report both the in-degree and out-degree distributions by industry, i.e., the number of inputs received and the deliveries made by each node of the U.S. production network. On average, the in-degree of an industry is higher than its out-degree.
As expected, the industry with the highest number of input industries (296) is the Retail Trade (code 4A0000), because retailers professionally sell physical goods to consumers. On the other hand, the industry with the highest number of purchasing industries (425) is the Wholesale Trade (code 420000), because wholesalers professionally distribute intermediate physical inputs to all industries. Yet, 'global' centralities measured by in-or out-degrees are of scarce interest to understand the 'local' role of an upstream industry with respect to each specific downstream output.
More properly, the Input Rank shall return the technological relevance 10 of that input market considering the peculiar topology of a supply network for any representative producer in an output industry. In Figure 5 , we visualize the results from the computation of the Input Rank as a matrix of industry-pair values. For the moment, we assume that producers do not have limits in exploring 10 As in similar works that use I-O tables, we implicitly assume that the latter represent a technology made of inputoutput relationships fixed in the medium term. We assume that the bundles of inputs, as well as the order in which they come, are fixed in the medium term. Inputs and processes can change with innovation only in a longer term. Expenditure shares are more endogenous to changing demand-supply equilibria. Further assumptions include the absence of economies of scale and the existence of representative firms. the supply network, thus = 1, and that the share of intermediate inputs across industries is constant, thus = = 0.5. The latter figure finds support on estimates by Acemoglu et al. (2012) made for the ensemble of the U.S. economy. A darker cell in Figure 5 implies that that input industry is more technologically relevant for that specific output. Interestingly, in the upper part of the figure, we find that services industries are much important across many manufacturing and services industries. Among manufacturing outputs, a crucial role is played by Primary Metal Manufacturing (code 331), Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing (332), and Mining industries (code 21).
In Tables 1 and 2, we report some moments of the Input Rank distributions, first for all the top 20 inputs, then for the top 20 manufacturing inputs excluding services. Here, as well, services industries are on average ranked higher than manufacturing industries. The first highly ranked input is the Management of Companies and Enterprises (code 550000), which includes headquarters services by holding firms 11 . Some post-production services also rank relatively high, as expected, e.g. Wholesale Trade (code 420000) and Advertising (code 541800). Further, we spot on top of rankings Electric Power Generation (code 221100) and bank credit (Monetary Authorities and Depository Credit Intermediation, code 52A000). From Appendix Table C1, Appendix Tables C2 and C3 , we find that the Input Rank is indeed much heterogeneous across production processes, with relatively high standard deviations across end-use industries.
In an Online Appendix, we also report computations of the Input Rank on world Input-Output Tables, namely WIOD (World Input-Output Tables, see Timmer et al., 2015) and Eora Global MRIO tables. Both databases have been extensively used in settings where the geographical dimension of GVCs is important. However, we prefer keeping our baseline analyses using U.S. tables for two main reasons. First, U.S. tables have a fine-grained disaggregation of industries that reduces the possibility of mixing intermediate inputs and final goods 12 . Second, our theoretical setup does not provide any foundation for considering the country of origin of an input. In fact, we assumed that an industry-level technology is fixed in the medium-long term, but we cannot extend this assumption to the origin countries of a sourcing strategy. 
The role of the Input Rank in choices of vertical integration
The decision to make or buy an input is an example of a situation when a producer needs gathering information on the technological relevance of both direct and indirect inputs. In this Section, we test whether the Input Rank can play a role as a determinant for the decision to integrate a production stage within the firm boundary (i.e., vertical integration) or, alternatively, signing supply contracts with independent firms (i.e., outsourcing). For our purpose, we will make use of a dataset of U.S. parent companies that have integrated at least one production stage over time. Our empirical strategy explicitly takes on the theoretical framework by Antràs and Chor (2013) , while augmenting the estimates by Del Prete and Rungi (2017) with the inclusion of the Input Rank. To validate our sample, we compare with official 'Data on Activities of Multinational Enterprises' (BEA, 2018) and OECD Statistics on Measuring Globalization (OECD, 2018) . In 2015, BEA (2018) reports 6,880 billion dollars of total sales by foreign affiliates and 12,628 billion dollars of total sales by parent companies. The U.S. multinational enterprises present in our sample account for 94% and 92% of the BEA (2018) values, respectively. The number of foreign affiliates in our sample corresponds to 88.6% on the total of U.S. foreign subsidiaries reported in OECD (2018), although the latter source only reports the values for the year 2014.
For the scope of our analysis, we map industry affiliations of both parent companies and subsidiaries from the NAICS rev. 2012 classification into the 2002 U.S. BEA I-O Input-Output Tables. The match by industry affiliations allows us combining firm-level data with sector-level metrics, including the Input Rank we computed in Section 4, the Relative Upstreamness segments sourced from Alfaro et al. (2019) , and a measure of Network Distance between any industry pair 14 calculated on the same U.S tables. In the absence of actual data on firm-to-firm transactions, such a mapping 15 allows us proxying buyer-supplier relationships. Finally, we complement our data 13 We follow international standards for the identification of corporate control structures (OECD, 2005; UNCTAD, 2009; UNCTAD, 2016) , according to which the unit of observation is the control link between a parent company and each of its subsidiary that is controlled after a concentration of voting rights (> 50%). See also Rungi et al. (2017) . Similar data structures have been used in Alviarez et al. (2016) , Cravino and Levchenko (2017) , Del Prete and Rungi (2017) . 14 The Network Distance between any input and any output in the U.S. I-O tables is the minimum number of downstream linkages that connect them through 15 For similar mappings of firm-level sourcing based on input-output tables and industry affiliations, see Charlton (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2010) , Alfaro et al. (2016) , Rungi and Del Prete (2018). with industry-level estimates of demand elasticity sourced from Broda and Weinstein (2006) , and with a measure of input contractibility retrieved from Antràs and Chor (2013) . 
Baseline results
We test a conditional logit model with parent-level fixed effects, as it is a natural empirical strategy for the multinomial case with a set of ex-ante alternatives 16 . That is, we test the determinants of vertical integration choices controlling for the characteristics of both the production stages that are vertically integrated and not integrated by the parent company.
Let ℎ = 1,2, … , denote the set of inputs, as from the input-output tables, and let = 1,2, … , denote the set of parent companies, each active in an output industry, = 1,2, … , . The dependent variable, ℎ ( ) , takes on a value 1 when at least one subsidiary in the h-th input market has been integrated by a parent r in industry k, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, for each parent company, we have a vector ℎ ( ) = � 1 ( ) , … , ( ) � made of 0s and 1s when a h-th input has been integrated or not, respectively. At this point, we can consider the probability that a generic parent chooses among a set of alternatives such that:
where ℎ is a set of ex ante alternative binary choices and each of its elements, ℎ ℎ , is equal to 1 when the h-th input is integrated, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, we identify a vector of covariates for each input-parent pair, ℎ ,which includes: the Input Rank of the h-th input with respect to the k-th industry estimated with a damping factor equal to 0.5; the minimum distance in a supply network of any h-th input from a k-th output; a binary variable Complements relative to the h-th input market; the input-output upstreamness sourced from Alfaro et al. (2019) ; the input-specific Contractibility derived from Rauch (1999) ; the bilateral normalized Direct requirement coefficient from I-O tables. As in Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) , the variable Complements is equal to 1 when the elasticity of substitution of the output market is below the median ( > ), and 0 otherwise ( < ). Errors are clustered by the parent company. Fixed effects are at the parent level. Results from nested specifications are reported in Tables 5.
The coefficient of immediate interest to us is the one on the Input Rank, which indicates whether the odds of vertical integration are higher for a more relevant input in the supply network. We do find that the coefficient of the Input Rank is positive and significant throughout all our estimates. Exponentiating the coefficients, we obtain a range of higher odds for vertical integration in a range between 1.21 and 1.56. In the first columns, we consider all parent companies, whether they are active in a manufacturing or a service industry. Please note that in further columns, when we introduce industry controls, the sample reduces to manufacturing parents only. This is mainly due to the inclusion of the elasticity of substitution by Broda and Weinstein (2006) , as it is originally estimated only on manufacturing imports. Note: Input Rank estimated with a damping factor = 0.5. Errors clustered by parent in parentheses. Variables are standardizes. ***, **, * stand for p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05 and p-value < 0.10, respectively.
Our findings are robust after the inclusion of the Input Upstreamness, which proxies the relative technological distance between an input and a target output. In this case, more distant inputs are less likely integrated by the parent company. The central tenet of the theoretical framework by Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) is tested by the sign of the interaction term between the Input Upstreamness and Complements. According to these authors, when final demand is sufficiently elastic (inelastic), parents integrate production stages that are more proxi-mate to (far from) final demand. This seems to be the case for producers of final goods (penultimate column in Table 5 ), although results are not significant anymore in the case of midstream parents (last column), i.e., the prediction by Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) is not verified in the case of integration choices started by producers of intermediate inputs. To extend the role of the elasticity of substitution to the case of supply networks, we include a similar interaction term between the variable Complements and the Input Rank. In this case, when final demand is sufficiently elastic, we find that the odds are proportionally higher that a central input is integrated within the boundary of the firm. More in general, the latter result is in line with our basic framework (see Section 3.5 and Proposition 2 in Appendix A), according to which a more elastic final demand makes downstream buyers more vulnerable to upstream frictions. In this case, we can argue, vertical integration could be a way to reduce the impact of upstream frictions.
Please note how, as expected, the Direct Requirement and the input-specific Contractibility have a positive and negative coefficient, respectively. In the first case, a higher value of the transaction (if any) is trivially correlated with higher odds of vertical integration. In the second case, a more contractible input is less likely integrated because the agreement between a producer and an independent supplier can be more easily enforced.
Robustness checks
Our baseline findings are robust to several checks of robustness. In Table 6 , we check whether sample compositions and changes in parameters can have an impact on the sign and significance of our coefficients of interest while keeping the Input Rank with a damping factor equal to 0.5. In the first column, we exclude inputs coming from the same 2-digit industry of the parent companies. In the second column, we exclude services inputs to check whether these are exclusively driving the correlation with the Input Rank, as we expect them to be more relevant on average, as from descriptive statistics. In the third column, we modify our indicator of Complements, explicitly considering the difference between the elasticities of the output and the one of each input, ( − ℎ ), i.e. introducing a reference point internal to the supply network. In the fourth column, we reduce our sample to the Top 100 (direct or indirect) inputs with the highest Input Rank. In all these cases, when an input is more technologically relevant in the supply network, the odds are higher that the parent companies will make rather than buy the input from an independent supplier.
In Appendix Tables C4 and C5 , we further control for: i) sample compositions when we consider only midstream manufacturing parents, i.e. parent that produce intermediate inputs; ii) empirical specifications different from the fixed-effects conditional logit. All main findings are similar in sign and significance with baseline estimates.
Finally, in Appendix Table C6 , we modify the Input Rank by plugging in the contractibility index retrieved by Rauch (1999) , in order to proxy a second component of the damping factor, , which allows us catching the knowledge of a supply network. All our main tenets are stable, although magnitudes of coefficients on the Input Rank generally increase. 
Manufacturing
Note: Input Rank estimated with a damping factor = 0.5. Errors clustered by parent in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05 and p-value < 0.10, respectively.
Conclusions
In this contribution, we introduced the Input Rank as a measure to catch the technological relevance of direct and indirect inputs in the supply network. We frame the input ranking problem as the solution of a representative producer that needs minimizing the impact of frictions coming from upstream markets when they can hit her marginal costs in a network-like production function.
The main intuition is that we must consider the peculiar topology of any supply network to derive the impact of any input on downstream marginal costs. Eventually, a (direct or indirect) input will rank relatively higher when considering the entire supply network: i) its direct requirements are higher; ii) it has a central position, i.e. it delivers to many other inputs; iii) it delivers to other inputs that have a central position; iv) the usage of intermediate inputs is higher than the usage of labor. For sake of comparison with previous GVC positioning metrics (e.g., downstreamness and upstreamness segments), we compute it on U.S. 2002 BEA Input-Output tables, and then we test how it correlates with firm-level choices of vertical integration made by U.S. parent companies worldwide. We do find that an input with a higher ranking more likely will be integrated within the boundary of the firm, even more so when the demand of the final product is more elastic. We argue that vertical integration allows downstream buyers reducing the possibility that frictions on upstream markets could hit their production processes, even more so when the margins from final sales are smaller. Our findings are robust to several checks on sample compositions, parameter choices, and empirical specifications. More in general, we argue that the Input Rank catches the recursive and complex nature of real-world supply networks, which have been too often represented as supposedly linear chains in studies on the international organization of production. Certainly, both empirics and theory need better considering the technological loops, kinks, and corners that can magnify or dampen a shock in a supply network, finally shaping the organizational response of the companies.
where for the last equality we used that = − ∏ ( ℎ ) − ℎ ℎ∈ + . Solving for ( , ), we get:
□ Lemma 2. The following relations are valid between firm-level marginal cost ( , ) and sectorlevel marginal cost , and between firm-level markup ( , ) and sector-level markup hold:
Proof of Lemma 2. Using results from the theory of monopolistic competition, the sector-level price of good k, , and the sector-level output, , are given with:
In the symmetric equilibrium, ( , ) = ( , ), and ( , ) = ( , ). Hence:
Thanks to the assumption of constant returns to scale and using the expression for , we can write the sector level marginal cost of production as:
Finally, from the firm's pricing rule we have ( , ) = ( , ) ( , ) . Plugging the pricing rule in the expression for price from A (11) and A (12), we get:
Q. E. D. □ Proof of Proposition 1. Taking logarithms 17 of (A6), using the pricing rule ( ℎ = ℎ ℎ ), and normalizing = 1, we get:
From Lemma 2, we can write the above equation in terms of sector level marginal costs as:
Writing the above equation for all k's in vector notation, we get:
To ease notation, we indicate logarithms with an accent on variables.
Finally, by differentiating we get:
Whenever ≠ ℎ, the above equation has a form: 
Taking logs and simplifying, we get:
As demand for good k is fixed, ( ) remains constant, and we note that:
where we used the symmetry property of the equilibrium ( , ) = ( , ) ∀ , ∈ , and the fact that ( , ) � ℎ = 0 , ∀ ≠ . We now write:
Finally, we note that Proof of Proposition 2. We can write the profit of firm i as:
Then, taking logs and differentiating: is also increasing in .
Q. E. D. □
B -Appendix: from the Page Rank to the Input Rank
The empirical intuition of the Input Rank comes from the 'personalized' version of the PageRank centrality, first used in social networks and search engines (Brin and Page, 1998) to present to users the most pertinent content. Some variants of the PageRank have been used in many domains (bibliometrics, biology, physics, engineering of infrastructures, financial exposure, etc.) as an alternative to the Katz (1953) centrality (Gleich, 2015) . The underlying assumption is that more important nodes (in our case, inputs) are likely to receive more links from other nodes (in our case, inputs of inputs), and that proximity to central nodes implies, in turn, a relatively higher centrality.
For our scope, we are interested in the 'local' outreach of a specific root buyer in her oriented supply network. Therefore, we need a 'personalization' of the ranking problem in the spirit of Haveliwala (2003) and White and Smyth (2003) , because different rankings are possible for different root nodes. Starting from the original formulation of the PageRank, adopting the notation proposed by Gleich (2015) , the eigenvalue/eigenvector problem can be represented by the following identity:
For our scope, we discuss the correspondence between elements in (B1) and their counterparts in the Input Rank (see Equation 11), in light of the peculiar economic process at stake:
• In the PageRank, a transition matrix contains the probabilities that an internet user clicks on one page following a web link present on the one she is visiting, column-normalized by the total number of received links, i.e. its in-degree. In the Input Rank, we use the matrix of an Input-Output table, , whose single elements are column-normalized buyer-supplier transactions, ℎ ∈ [0, 1].
• A vector is a critical tool that allows for the 'personalization' of the PageRank. In the absence of 'personalization', this vector contains just a uniform distribution of probability across all web pages, which is valid for all users. A 'personalization' entails a non-uniform distribution of probabilities, such that a region of the web will be more likely visited. At the same time, the vector is a unitary vector that algebraically extends the same (uniform or non-uniform) distribution in across web users. In our Input Rank, we can think of the combination of and as a specific portion of the production network, where the supply network of a root producer can be found. In a nutshell, in the case of the Input Rank, the representative producer in an output market will be able to explore only the technology of its supply network.
• The term ∈ (0, 1) is a teleportation parameter in the PageRank, otherwise called a damping factor. It indicates the probability that a 'web surfer' interrupts random navigation following page-to-page links and falls elsewhere, on any other web page not directly linked to the one she is visiting. By converse, (1 − ) is the probability that the user goes on randomly following her web path made of cross-link citations. In our Input Rank, we substitute with the product of two parameters, and . The first indicates the relative usage of intermediate inputs, as from the Cobb-Douglas production function of Equation (5).
The second indicates the ability of the producer to navigate her supply network, as from Definition 2.
• Finally, is the solution to the eigenvalue problem in (B1). In the case of the PageRank, it indicates the relevance of the web content for each user, as for example after a query from a search engine. In the Input Rank, a vector represents an ordering of all direct and indirect inputs based on the impact that any upstream friction may have on the marginal costs of a representative firm in the k-th industry. Note: The Input Rank is estimated with a damping factor equal to 0.5. Errors clustered by parent in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05 and p-value < 0.10, respectively. Note: The Input Rank is estimated with a damping factor equal to 0.5. Errors clustered by parent in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05 and p-value < 0.10, respectively. Note: The Input Rank is estimated with a damping factor equal to input contractibility à la Rauch (1999) , specific for each input industry. Errors clustered by parent in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05 and p-value < 0.10, respectively.
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